NOTES
COMMITMENT-CONDITIONAL

RELEASE FROM MENTAL INSTITU-

TIONS MADE AVAILABLE TO PERSONS CONFINED UNDER CRIMINAL STATUTES-State

v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).

In January of 1969, Milton Carter entered police headquarters
in Plainfield, New Jersey and proceeded to shoot and wound a
policeman.' He was subsequently "indicted for assault with intent
to kill and for other related offenses."'2 A year later, Carter was
given a sanity hearing 3 at which the Union County Court found
him both incapable of standing trial and legally insane at the time
of the offense, resulting in a dismissal of the indictment. 4 FollowState v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 386, 316 A.2d 449, 451 (1974). Carter entered police
headquarters armed with a .38 calibre revolver, went to the second floor, held a police
sergeant captive, and shot him twice in the chest. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 1, State v.
Carter, No. A-3005-71 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Mar. 2, 1973). There was no apparent
reason for Carter's action. Brief for State of New Jersey as Amicus Curiae at 1, State v.
Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Amicus Curiae].
References made about Carter throughout the opinion reveal he had an I.Q. of 67 and was
about 23 years old at the time of the offense. State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 412 n.ln, 316 A.2d
449, 466 (Clifford, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). His condition had been
alternately diagnosed as "one of mental deficiency rather than mental illness," as "mental
defective with incipient schizophrenia," and as "a catatonic type of schizophrenia." Id. at
386-87, 316 A.2d at 451-52. Prior to the shooting, Carter was withdrawn and had a record
of psychiatric treatment. Id. at 386, 316 A.2d at 451.
2 Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 1.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant-Appellant]. Carter spent time both at Trenton
Psychiatric Hospital and Union County Jail prior to the hearing which was held in May,
1970. Id.
4 State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 386, 316 A.2d 449, 451 (1974). Procedure regarding a
finding of incapacity to stand trial and insanity warranting pre-trial dismissal is governed by
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-2 (1971), which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be competent for the judge if sitting without a jury, or the jury, if one is
impanelled, to determine not only the sanity of the accused at the time of the
hearing, but as well the sanity of the accused at the time the offense charged against
him is alleged to have been committed.
If it shall be determined ... that the accused was insane at the time the offense
charged against him is alleged to have been committed, the charge against him shall
be dismissed on this ground and the records of the proceedings so noted.
This statute does not define insanity nor does it indicate that the test used to determine
insanity at the time of the hearing is necessarily different from the test used to determine
insanity at the time of the offense. However, the court in Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 153
A.2d 665 (1959), stated that the absence of distinct tests did not mean the legislature
intended to establish a single concept 6f insanity, and that the following definitions are
controlling in their respective situations: (1) As a test of competency to stand trial, the test is
whether the person can comprehend his situation and consult intelligently with counsel;

NOTES

ing a finding that his insanity continued, Carter was committed to
the New Jersey State Hospital in Trenton " 'until such time as he
may be restored to reason.' "I
After being shunted between various institutions for a period
of two years, Carter was released, without court approval, to his
parents' custody by order of the Trenton State Hospital's medical
director.6 Subsequently, the State moved for a hearing on the issue
(2) as a defense to criminal prosecution, the defendant must have been
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he
was doing was wrong.
Id. at 450-51, 153 A.2d at 669-70. The latter is the M'Naghten rule, stemming from Daniel
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), which is well established in New Jersey, and
has been forcefully reiterated and defended in State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 68-72, 152 A.2d
50, 66-69 (1959). More recently, the doctrine was reaffirmed in State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203,
212-13, 287 A.2d 715, 720 (1972).
5 State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 386, 316 A.2d 449, 451 (1974) (quoting from N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:163-2 (1971)). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 163-2 (1971) provides that when charges are
dismissed on grounds of insanity,
the judge or jury ... shall also find separately whether his insanity in any degree
continues, and, if it does, shall order him into safe custody and direct him to be sent
to the New Jersey state hospital at Trenton, to be confined ...until such time as he
may be restored to reason ....
There has been conflicting opinion regarding the basis on which the judge or jury
should find the defendant's insanity continues and order commitment. Three views have
been propounded. The most current one recommends a charge that the jury find continuing insanity if the underlying illness is found to continue. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY CHARGES § 3.180, at 9 (1973). This is the release standard
promulgated in State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 218-19, 287 A.2d 715, 723 (1972), which defined
"restored to reason" as cure or effective neutralization of the underlying mental illness. See

Note, Release from Confinement of Persons Acquitted Zy Reason of Insa:ity in New Jersey, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 160, 170 (1973) (Maik standard harmonized with the M'Naghten test); Note,
M'Naghten and Public Security-Post-AcquittalRelease PotentialReduced Under Temporary Insanity
Defense, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 295, 307-08 (1972) (post-acquittal commitment as affected by
Maik release standard).

The Maik standard is currently under attack in State v. Krol, No. A-707-72 (N.J. Super.
Ct., App. Div., April 9, 1974), cert. granted, No. 10,532 (N.J. June 19, 1974). DefendantAppellant Krol argues that the Maik standard violates the equal protection and due process

clauses of the fourteenth amendment because different standards of release than those
applied in civil commitments may result in lifetime confinement for one committed under
criminal statutes. Petition for Certification at 5, State v. Krol, No. 10,532 (N.J. June 19,
1974).
The other two views regarding the basis for commitment appear in Carter. The majority
implies that the test is whether M'Naghten insanity continues. 64 N.J. at 388, 316 A.2d at 453.
The separate opinion by Justice Clifford specified the standard warranting commitment to
be danger to self and others. 64 N.J. at 421, 316 A.2d at 470 (citing Aponte v. State, 30 N.J.
441, 455, 153 A.2d 665, 672 (1959)). See note 4 supra.
6 State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 386, 316 A.2d 449, 451-52 (1974). Although N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 163-2 (1971) directs that a person can be released only by order of'the committing court, the hospital, evidently considering Carter a civil commitment, granted a civil
discharge. See Letter from Martin H. Weinberg, M.D., then Medical Director of Trenton
Psychiatric Hospital to Judge Barger, superior court judge in Union County, June 29, 1972,
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of whether Carter was in fact eligible for release under the "restored to reason" test, which requires freedom from underlying
mental illness.7 At this hearing the court found Carter continued to
suffer from schizophrenia" and mental retardation 9 and determined there was no form of release available which would adequately protect the public. The court consequently ruled Carter
was not "restored to reason" and ordered him to return to the state
hospital. 10
On appeal, the court rejected Carter's contentions that the
finding of the court below was against the weight of the evidence
and that current New Jersey law authorized a conditional release.' 1
In a per curiam decision, the appellate division held the lower
court's finding to be supported by the evidence, and conditional
release, even if available, to be unjustified in Carter's case. 2 The
court further stated that authorization for conditional release could
13
only come from the legislature or the supreme court.
Carter brought his appeal to the supreme court, challenging
the release standard utilized by the lower courts as medically
and Answering Letter from Judge Barger to Dr. Weinberg, July 7, 1972, on file at Seton Hall
Law Review.
State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 218-19, 287 A.2d 715, 723 (1972).
64 N.J. at 387, 316 A.2d at 452. A diagnosis of schizophrenia is based initially on the
presence of the fundamental symptoms. Although "schizophrenia does not necessarily imply
progressive deterioration," the disease is considered virtually incurable. See L. HINSIE & R.
CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 679-80 (4th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HINSIE &
CAMPBELL]. This creates the potential problem that under the standard established by Maik a
person diagnosed schizophrenic may not be released even though the symptoms on which
the diagnosis was based have disappeared.
9 State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 387, 316 A.2d 449, 452 (1974). New Jersey statutes define
"mental retardation" as
a state of significant subnormal intellectual development with reduction of social
competence in a minor or adult person [which] existed prior to adolescence and is
expected to be of life duration.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-23 (Supp. 1974-75). Carter's l.Q. was designated at 67. See note I
supra. Thus, the 1968 revision of psychiatric nomenclature would classify Carter as mildly
mentally retarded. HINSIE & CAMPBELL, supra note 8, at 665 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968)).
II State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 387, 316 A.2d 449, 452 (1974).
" State v. Carter, No. A-3005-71, at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., March 2, 1973).
12 Id.
13 Id. The appellate division rejected the argument that Maik authorized a conditional
release and apparently found no support for granting such a release in either section
2A: 163-2 or section 2A: 163-3 which provide for release only when an individual is "restored
to reason." Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 163-2, -3 (1971). Judge Halpern, dissenting, stated
Maik placed a responsibility upon the courts to "make considered judgments and take
calculated risks in releasing defendants." He would grant release when the defendant's
illness is neutralized and when his level of reason indicates that he will not be a threat to
himself or society. State v. Carter, No. A-3005-71, at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., March 2,
1973) (Halpern, J., dissenting).
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unjustified and constitutionally unreasonable.1 4 Carter argued that
the standards governing release of individuals whose criminal
charges had been dismissed should be the same as the standards
governing release of those confined under civil commitment
statutes.1 5 Conditional release, he contended, was not only constitu6
tionally mandated but also the humane course of action.
Confronted with these issues, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in State v. Cartert 7 held that while release requires either
cure or effective neutralization of the underlying mental illness, 8
conditional release may be granted to one in remission. 19 Conditional release hinges upon a clear and convincing demonstration °
that the patient is a fit subject for such release, 2 1 that he is unable
to benefit by further confinement, 22 and that available supervisory
and out-patient facilities are adequate to assure his safe return to
society.2 3 The court's decision makes conditional release available
to those confined following acquittal on grounds of insanity as well
as to those confined pursuant to a pre-trial dismissal of charges on
2
grounds of insanity.

4

14 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 3, at 4-5, 8.
'5 Id. at 7-8.
I Id. at 9-10.

64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
11 Id. at 399-400, 316 A.2d at 459. The court in State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d
715 (1972), enunciated the standard which required the underlying illness to be "removed"
or "effectively neutralized." Id. at 218-19, 287 A.2d 723. While adhering to this standard and
determining that neutralization meant something less than a complete cure, the court in
Carter asserted that the effect of the neutralization must be to free the individual from his
underlying condition. 64 N.J. at 399-400, 316 A.2d at 459.
19 64 N.J. at 389, 316 A.2d at 453. "Remission" is defined as partial or complete
"[albatement of the symptoms and signs of a disorder or disease." HINSIE & CAMPBELL, supra
note 8, at 659.
In Carter, the court differentiates neutralization and remission, regarding the latter as a
"mere abatement of symptoms" carrying with it no guarantee that reason will prevail. 64
N.J. at 399, 316 A.2d at 458. The court views neutralization as a state in which the individual
can cope with the world without supervision. Id. at 400, 316 A.2d at 459. It explains that
while neutralization is not an outright cure of the illness, it is a state which the
patient has achieved where there is no danger to those around him of injury from a
psychotic episode arising from the illness.
Id.
20 For a discussion of this standard see notes 126-27 infra and accompanying text.
21 64 N.J. at 404, 316 A.2d at 461. By "fit subject" the court appears to mean a patient
who would not endanger himself or others, who would function and benefit from release,
and who would willingly and cooperatively participate in an out-patient program. Id. at
403-04, 316 A.2d at 461.
22 Id. at 404, 316 A.2d at 461. For a discussion of the criteria warranting continued
confinement see notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
23 64 N.J. at 403, 406, 316 A.2d at 461-62.
24 Id. at 399 n.7, 316 A.2d at 458. The court states that "[t]he standards for release
under this section [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 163-3] and N.J.S.A. 2A: 163-2 are identical." Id.
17
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The state's power to confine individuals relieved of criminal
accountability on grounds of insanity is traditionally based upon its
"police power" interest in protecting its citizens from persons
deemed dangerous and its parens patriae interest in rehabilitating
and caring for the mentally ill. 25 Confinement is therefore justified
by the individual's threat to society and/or his need for treatment.
The question of release becomes a dilemma when a person
may still present some threat to society but is at a stage where
further confinement is anti-therapeutic. On one hand, there is a
risk inherent in releasing such an individual. On the other, by
denying release, the state may be condemning him to further
deterioration and almost certain lifetime confinement.2 6 This results in the situation whereby one deemed "innocent" of criminal
liability is confined indefinitely, while one deemed "guilty" of the
same offense can be released after a comparatively short prison
term.

27

2- See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the state's interest in
involuntary confinement reflects "dual motives," one being "society's concern with antisocial
conduct" and the second "involving its role as parens patriae"). See also Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1972) (traditional state interests justifying the state's power to commit
persons to mental institutions include concern for public safety and treatment of the
individual).
For a discussion of the state's power to commit see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On
the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968) (discussion and critique of
the impact of traditional state interests on actual confinement standards); Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207-11, 1222-35 (1974) (a
thorough discussion of the various bases of state's power: parens patriae and police power).
26

See generally Kimmel, Patterns Of Psychiatric Treatment, 21

BROOKLYN BARRISTER

186,

190 (1970). In a study of 7,000 mental cases in the 1950's, half of the subjects were
institutionalized and treated, and half received no treatment at all. This study revealed that a
greater number of the untreated group recovered sooner, apparently spontaneously. Id. It
was the contention of a state psychiatrist in a recent conditional release hearing that
the petitioner's condition may deteriorate if he were not granted some form of
release. The deterioration, which they have witnessed in other long-term patients,
leads to a dependency on institutional care and ultimately an inability, to function
outside institutionalization.
Letter from Bal K. Kaushal, M.D., Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, to author, August 21, 1974,
on file at Seton Hall Law Review.
27 State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 213, 287 A.2d 715, 720 (1972). In New Jersey, offenders
may be granted probation, in which case they serve no sentence at all and are placed instead
under the supervision of a probation officer for a period of one to five years. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 168-1 (1971). Convicted offenders are eligible for parole after serving a specific
fraction of their sentence. See id. § 30:4-123.10; id. § 30:4-123.12 (Supp. 1973-74).
The plight of those who are deemed mentally ill and subjected to indefinite commitment is made more acute by the overprediction of dangerousness and subsequent
confinement of many who actually present no threat to society. See Dershowitz, The
Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
February, 1969, at 47; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 25, at 85; Schreiber,
Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarcerationof Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and Problems, 56 VA.
L. REV. 602, 619 (1970). The situation is further exacerbated by the present state of mental
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When deciding the issue of whether to release such an individual, states are confronted with two criteria: public safety and
welfare of the individual. In some instances, the duty to protect the
public has been deemed overriding. 28 In other cases, this duty has
been balanced against the patient's constitutional rights under the
29
fourteenth amendment.
The New Jersey courts, left to wrestle with the problem in a
30
vacuum created by the lack of legislative standards and remedies,
hospitals which have become repositories for individuals who are unwanted or undesirable.
See Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: 1969 Style, 10 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 74, 75 (1970).
28 The New Jersey supreme court, for example, has placed considerable emphasis upon
its police power duty to protect the public. See, e.g., State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 213, 287 A.2d
715, 720 (1972), in which the court observed:
The point to be stressed is that in drawing a line between the sick and the bad,
there is no purpose to subject others to harm at the hands of the mentally ill. On
the contrary, the aim of the law is to protect the innocent from injury by the sick as
well as the bad.
See also State v. Taylor, 158 Mont. 323, 331-32, 491 P.2d 877, 881 (1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 978 (1972); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 83, 88, 152 A.2d 50, 75, 77 (1959) (Weintraub,
C.J., concurring).
29 Cases involving the rights of those confined to mental institutions pursuant to
criminal indictments have involved both equal protection and due process arguments. In the
area of equal protection, some courts have held that those criminally committed must be
accorded the same procedural safeguards as those civilly committed. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). See also
Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323,
329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd mem., 412 U.S. 914 (1973); People v. McCabe, 74 Misc. 2d
1060, 347 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261 (Nassau County Ct. 1973); State ex rel. Walker v. Jenkins, 203
S.E.2d 353, 357-58 (W. Va. 1974).
Some courts have interpreted Jackson and Baxstrom to mandate essentially equal standards pertaining to the commitment and release of the civilly and criminally mentally ill. See
State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, -, 515 P.2d 324, 329 (1973) (Baxstrom and Jackson indicate
that where there is a significant difference between the standards applied to the criminally
committed and the civilly committed, the equal protection clause is violated). But see State ex
rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 173, 207 N.W.2d 809, 821 (1973) (Jackson's mandate
construed to apply only to proceedings which ignore the bases for exercising the state's
power of indefinite commitment).
Cases have also held that due process requirements apply to the confinement of the
mentally ill. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F.
Supp. 1320, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
0.Governing statutes do not provide administrative procedure or standards to oversee
release. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 163-2, -3 (1971). The court has therefore approached the
question of release guardedly. In State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 86, 152 A.2d 50, 76-77 (1959),
Chief Justice Weintraub took-the position that any deviation from current judicial standards
which would result in the release of those relieved of criminal accountability on grounds of
insanity would depend on legislative and administrative action. However, in State v. Maik, 60
N.J. 203, 220-21, 287 A.2d 715, 724 (1972), he appeared to be moving toward considering a
judicially fashioned release predicated on certain conditions being met.
Pending legislation, though not solving the problems beleaguering conditional release,
does offer additional guidance in the procedure to be followed. See N.J. Senate Bill No.
1115, §§ 5a-f (introduced on April 22, 1974) [hereinafter cited as S. 1115]. This legislation
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have generally favored public safety, preferring to leave aside
constitutional considerations.3 1 In doing so they have been guided
by three statutes3 2 which, prior to 1972, had the cumulative effects
of authorizing confinement for those found incompetent to stand
trial until they achieved competency 33 and of requiring inwotvld adopt the Model Penal Code definition of criminal responsibility, replacing the
M'Naghten rule with one dependent upon whether
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial and adequate capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
S. 111.5, § Ia. Compare id. with MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The bill provides for defendants to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of
Institutions and Agencies for "custody, cure and treatment." S. 1115, § 5a. The Commissioner or his designee becomes the authorized moving party regarding the release of those
in his custody. Id. § 5b. Following a report from two court-appointed psychiatrists, the court,
if satisfied "that the committed person may be discharged, released on condition without
danger to himself or others, or treated as in civil commitment," may order his discharge, his
conditional release, or his transfer. Id. § 5c. If the court is not satisfied, it orders a hearing at
which the person seeking release bears the burden of proving he may "safely be discharged
or released." Id. The bill provides for the court to retain jurisdiction for a period of five
years. Id. § 5d. The bill further provides that those not discharged within ten years after
initial commitment either be discharged or confined subject to the law governing civil
commitments. Id. § 5f.
Pending legislation, concerning those incompetent to stand trial, provides procedures
similar to those found in S. 1115, in the event that the court finds a conditional release to be
appropriate. See N.J. Senate Bill No. 1116, §§ 4a-d (introduced on April 22, 1974).
The rights of indigents confined to New Jersey mental institutions will be affected by
pending action contemplated by the Division of Mental Health Advocacy within the Department of the Public Advocate. The Division will have field offices in Newark and Trenton
to handle commitment and habeas corpus hearings from Mercer and Essex counties, and a
class action office in Trenton to handle those matters in which a large class is affected. The
Division's primary purpose is representation of clients from which should flow a body of case
law and a greater awareness of problems inherent in the mental health field. The ultimate
goal is to insure that the mentally ill are able to exercise their constitutional rights. Interview
with Michael L. Perlin, Director, Division of Mental Health, Department of the Public
Advocate, in Trenton, New Jersey, July 1, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Perlin Interview].
31 See note 28 supra.
32 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:163-2, -3 (1971); id. § 30:4-82 (Supp. 1973-74).
33 Id. § 2A:163-2 (1971) provides that one found incompetent to stand trial
be confined in an institution as provided by section 30:4-82 of the Revised Statutes,
and his custody and release from such institution shall be governed by the provisions of said section.
Id. § 30:4-82 (Supp. 1973-74) provides:
When ... such person is in a condition to be discharged... as being in a state
of remission and free of symptoms of the mental disease which required his original
transfer. .. such person shall be remanded by order of the court to the place in
which he was confined under commitment, indictment or sentence .. . there to be
dealt with according to law ....
Since section 30:4-82 makes the remission of the symptoms which required the original
transfer a condition precedent for release, it has the effect, when combined with section
2A: 163-2, of requiring competency to stand trial as a prerequisite for release from the
mental institution. Theoretically, for one suffering from mental retardation, confinement
could be for life. But see note 65 infra.
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stitutionalization for those dismissed or acquitted of charges on
34
grounds of insanity until they were "restored to reason.
Although the court did not define "restored to reason" until
State v. Maik3 5 in 1972, problems inherent in releasing those
deemed criminally insane had been discussed years earlier by Chief
36
Justice Weintraub in his concurring opinion in State v. Lucas.
Agreeing with the majority that the Durham test of legal insanity
should be rejected, 37 the former Chief Justice set forth the reasoning which laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions regarding
commitment and release of those acquitted on grounds of insanity.
Emphasizing that psychiatric opinion was too vague and uncertain
to play a determinative role when the release of someone acquitted
on grounds of insanity was at stake, he concluded public safety
could not "depend upon a science which can produce such
conflicting estimates of probable human behavior. 38 Chief Justice
Weintraub then put forth the conditions under which the court
might grant such a release, including more definite medical testimony, parole supervision, provision for summary recall upon
signs of recurrence, and the ability of medical directors to handle
increased responsibility.3 9 Without such assurances, which he
stated could be provided only by the legislative and executive
branches, the judiciary could not venture from its then current
40
view of criminal responsibility.
The rationale expressed by Chief Justice Weintraub in Lucas
was reiterated in Maik when the court first addressed itself to what
the "restored to reason" standard required.4 1 In Maik, the court
was dealing with a defendant who had experimented with hallucinogenic drugs and had subsequently experienced a psychotic
episode during which he stabbed a friend to death. 4 ' Although the
defendant was in remission when the case was argued, 43 the court
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 163-2 (1971) (commitment following dismissal of charges); id.
§ 2A:163-3 (1971) (commitment following acquittal at trial).
35 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972).
36 30 N.J. 37, 82, 152 A.2d 50, 74 (1959).
31 Id. at 83, 152 A.2d at 75. The Durham test establishes that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The test was
rejected by the District of Columbia court of appeals in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38 30 N.J. at 86, 152 A.2d at 76.
39 Id.
40

Id. at 86, 152 A.2d at 76-77.

4' 60 N.J. at 217, 287 A.2d at 722.
42

Id. at 207, 210-12, 287 A.2d at 717, 718-20.

41 See note 19 supra.
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held the safety of society would be insured only if the patient's
underlying condition was cured or effectively neutralized. 4 4 The
Maik court also ruled it was the duty of the committing court to
decide the ultimate question of whether release should be
45
granted.
In weighing the-needs of public safety against the uncertainties
of releasing an individual in remission, the Maik court opted for
public safety.4 6 Under the rationale of Maik, for example, a person
afflicted with schizophrenia 47 and mental retardation 48 would be
otherwise function at
confined for life, despite the fact he might
49
home without harm to himself or others.
Although the fact situation did not present the issue of
whether a conditional type of release might permit a less stringent
standard to be applied, language in Maik seemed to invite a later
judicial fashioning of such a remedy:
[W]e do not deal with the question whether the court may order
a release conditioned upon a defendant's return to custody if
signs of an oncoming acute illness should appear .... If adequate

medical assurance could be given that supervision
is reasonably
50
feasible, that course would be humane.
Shortly after Maik was decided, the United States Supreme
Court in Jackson v. Indiana5" declared that a state could not constitutionally commit an alleged offender for an indefinite period
44 60 N.J. at 218-19, 287 A.2d at 723. The meaning of "neutralization" as a requisite for
release is the subject of disagreement in the Carteropinion. The majority describes neutralization as being
something less than a complete "cure," allowing for the limited possibility of relapses. The individual whose condition is "neutralized" can cope with the world as it
is, without supervision and guidance. . . . [I]t is a state which the patient has
achieved where there is no danger to those around him of injury from a psychotic
episode arising from the illness.
64 N.J. at 399-400, 316 A.2d at 459. Justice Clifford, disagreeing with the majority, finds
absolutely no warrant for the majority opinion's statement that the Maik Court
"indicated that something less than a 'cure' is acceptable for compliance with the
'restored to reason' standard of conditional release.
Id. at 420, 316 A.2d at 470.
45 60 N.J. at 219-20, 287 A.2d at 723-24.
46 Id. at 217-19, 287 A.2d at 722-23.

For a discussion of schizophrenia see note 8 supra.
For a discussion of mental retardation see note 9 supra.
. It should be noted that Milton Carter had been living at home with his family and
working steadily for a year without incident. 64 N.J. at 412 n.ln, 316 A.2d at 465-66. Both
the trial and appellate courts ordered him recommitted on the basis that his underlying
condition-mental retardation and schizophrenia--continued. See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
50 60 N.J. at 220-21, 287 A.2d at 724.
"' 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
41

48
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simply because of his incompetency to stand trial. 52 The petitioner
in Jackson was a mentally retarded deaf-mute who could communicate only in limited sign language.5 3 He had been charged with
robbery and, following a plea of not guilty, was given a competency
hearing pursuant to the Indiana Criminal Code and subsequently
committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until
54
certified sane.
The Court found Jackson's commitment violated his right to
equal protection because the criminal standard for commitment,
incompetency to stand trial, was less demanding than civil commitment standards, inability to care for self or dangerousness to
one's own and others' welfare. Furthermore, the criminal release
standard was more stringent than the civil release standard.5 5 The
Court intimated that Jackson would probably never have been
committed under the civil standard, but that if he had, he would
probably have been eligible for release.5 6 The net effect of the
criminal commitment upon Jackson was to confine him for life.5 7
In reaching its decision, the Jackson Court relied upon its
earlier decision in Baxstrom v. Herold.58 In that case, the Court held
that a state convict who was civilly committed upon termination of
his prison sentence on the finding of a surrogate was denied equal
protection in that he was deprived of a jury trial that the state
made available to other patients. 59 The Court reasoned that prior
criminal conviction and sentencing did not justify the difference in
procedure; hence, Baxstrom was denied equal protection when he
was committed to an institution for "dangerously mentally ill" persons without a judicial determination that he was dangerous-a
procedure guaranteed to others. 60 The Jackson Court, incorporating Baxstrom, held that if criminal conviction and imposition of
sentence were insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive
protection against indefinite commitment, then the "mere filing of
6
criminal charges" in Jackson's case could not suffice. '
The Court also held Jackson's commitment violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment on the rationale that
Id. at 720.
53 Id. at 717.
54 Id. at 717-19.
15 Id. at 727-30.
56 Id. at 727-29.
Id. at 725-26, 729-30.
I1
58 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
59 Id.at 114-15.
52

60 Id.
61 406 U.S. at 724.
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"due process requires that. the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. 6 2 It therefore concluded that a person
deemed incompetent to stand trial could not be held indefinitely.63
Such a person must be civilly committed or released when there is
no substantial probability that he will attain this capacity in the
foreseeable future or when confinement is not aiding his progress
64
toward that goal.

The Jackson decision has had great impact on New Jersey
procedure regarding commitment of those deemed incompetent to
stand trial. 6 5 At the same time, the decision has provided judicial
authority for an attack on state power to confine the mentally ill
66
when unaccompanied by a showing of a valid state interest.
Although some of the constitutional issues presented in Jackson
were argued before the Carter court, 6 7 the majority eschewed constitutional questions, preferring to base its decision to grant con62 Id. at 738.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 The Jackson decision was implemented in New Jersey in Dixon v. Cahill, No.
L-30977-71 (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., Jan. 4, 1973). According to the director of Mental
Health Advocacy, Jackson and Dixon had the effect of removing many patients from Vroom
Building, the maximum security Forensic Division of Trenton Psychiatric Hospital, to civil
hospitals. Prior to these decisions, those found incompetent to stand trial, those whose
charges had been dismissed, and those who had been acquitted on grounds of insanity were
confined in Vroom Building. FollowingJackson and Dixon, those adjudicated incompetent to
stand trial were transferred to civil confinement unless it was found they would achieve
competency in the foreseeable future or they needed maximum security confinement. See
Singer v. State, 63 N.J. 319, 307 A.2d 94, cert. granted, 63 N.J. 504, 308 A.2d 669 (1973).
Those confined following dismissal or acquittal were also transferred to civil confinement
absent a need for maximum security or treatment available only at Vroom Building. Of
approximately 160 patients on whose behalf petitions were filed following Dixon, relief was
obtained for about 120. Perlin Interview, supra note 30.
66 InJackson, Justice Blackmun notes that traditional bases for committing the mentally
ill have included "dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and the need for care or
treatment or training." 406 U.S. at 737 (footnote omitted). He adds, however, that the Court
did not even have to address itself to the validity of these bases because Indiana did not
purport to rely upon any of these with regard to Jackson's commitment. Id. The Court
determined that his commitment was irrelevant to his capacity to function outside
confinement, or to society's concern in restraining him, or to the State's capability to help
him. Consequently, it was a violation of due process. Id. at 737-38.
67 See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
68 64 N.J. at 410, 316 A.2d at 464. The Carter majority evidently felt that by providing a
form of conditional release, it had obviated the need to consider the question of equal
protection:
Our judgment on the question of conditional release renders it unnecessary at
this time to reach a claim of unconstitutionality under the equal protection clause.
Id. Although counsel confined itself to an equal protection argument, Justice Clifford, in his
dissent, noted that due process requirements render Maik suspect. See id. at 420, 316 A.2d at
470.
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ditional release on legislative intent, 69 the right to treatment,7 0 and
the court's traditional power to fashion remedies. 7' Rather than
follow the line of reasoning presented in Jackson, the court followed that propounded in Maik, apparently endeavoring to hold
closely to the type of release it interpreted Maik as authorizing. 2 In
seeking to soften the harsh effect of Maik yet also to honor that
court's concern with public safety,7 3 the court fashioned a conditional release based upon a balance between protection of the
74
public and the therapeutic need for release.
At a "Carter" conditional release hearing, the judge must conduct as broad an inquiry as possible, covering the patient's background, initial offense, available out-patient care, family life and
potential job situation. 75 He must hear and resolve conflicts in
testimony from psychiatrists and, if not satisfied, call additional
experts. 7 6 Ultimately, he must make findings of fact as to the
applicant's state of mental health and the conditions necessary to
adequately assure his safe return to society. 77 If the evidence
7 8
clearly and convincingly demonstrates the propriety of release
09 Id. at 390-91, 316 A.2d at 454. The court also found a legislative intent to provide
humane treatment for the mentally ill, of which conditional release is a part to the extent it is
therapeutically indicated. Id. at 393, 316 A.2d at 455.
70 Id. at 393-94, 316 A.2d at 455-56. For a discussion of right to treatment see note 100
infra.
71 64 N.J. at 392-93, 316 A.2d at 455. The court noted specifically its power to provide
probation in the criminal context and concluded there is no logical distinction between its
authority in that context and its authority to fashion an analogous release system for those
adjudicated insane. Id. at 393, 316 A.2d at 455.
72 Id. at 400, 316 A.2d at 459. The court interpreted Maik as authorizing conditional
release as "a third alternative for release if one has not been fully 'restored to reason' or
one's condition 'neutralized.' " Id. (footnote omitted).
73 Id. at 388-89, 316 A.2d at 453.
74 Id. at 409-10, 316 A.2d at 464. The court also expressed this balance as follows:
The basis for his confinement is rehabilitation and treatment. Any standards for
release must be based on this nature of commitment, given the overriding concern
for the public safety.
Id. at 401, 316 A.2d at 459. This language reflects a continuing viewpoint that the state's role
as public protector should be weighed against its role as parens patriae rather than against
the individual's constitutional rights. See notes 28-29 supra.
75 64 N.J. at 403, 316 A.2d at 461.
76 Id. at 406, 316 A.2d at 462.
71 Id. For a more complete description of the function of the trial judge presiding at a
conditional release hearing see United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502, 513-15 (D.C. Cir.
1970). For a discussion of some of the problems inherent in granting conditional release to
one acquitted on grounds of insanity see United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1973). The Ecker court affirmed a denial of conditional release on grounds that
expert testimony was based on insufficient evidence. Id. at 1208.
78 64 N.J. at 408, 316 A.2d at 463. The court's requirement of a clear and convincing
standard is apparently based on the patient's declared insanity and "the State's concern with
public safety." Id. For a discussion of Justice Clifford's dissent on this issue see notes 121-24
infra and accompanying text.
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he will authorize it, retaining jurisdiction to insure the court's
power to recall the patient summarily if a "problem has arisen
which jeopardizes the safety and well being of the patient or those
around him. ' 79 The trial court must continue to monitor the patient by reports from the patient and supervising psychiatrists,
which reports are channelled through a court-appointed probation
80
officer.
Requirements for release under Carter are predicated both on
the existence of adequate environmental and supervisory controls
and on the mental state of the patient."' Perhaps the most important requirement is the availability of long-term psychiatric outpatient care.8 2 Understandably, the patient must be a willing and
cooperative participant in such care, the main purpose of which is
to enable the psychiatrist to monitor, anticipate, and thus prevent
psychotic episodes.8 " The patient's potential home and work environment, if not therapeutic, must at least "not aggravate his
condition." 4
Concerning the patient's mental state, dangerousness-which
is the basis for involuntary civil confinement-is to be considered,
but it is not "the sole criterion for release."8 5 The court states that
Some courts have sought to resolve the burden of proof issue through an equal
protection rationale. See Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (equal
protection requires that the burden of proof for those committed under criminal statutes be
the same as that for civilly committed patients). One court, holding that equal protection
mandated similar burdens of proof, has, in effect, placed the burden on the state to prove
the patient is still insane. State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, -,"-, 515 P.2d 324, 327, 329
(1973).
9 64 N.J. at 408, 316 A.2d at 463. This "implies some territorial restrictions on the
patient's right to travel." Id. at 409, 316 A.2d at 463. Conditional release for civilly committed patients also provides for summary recall. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-107 (Supp.
1974-75).
80 64 N.J. at 408, 316 A.2d at 463.
81 Id. at 403-07, 316 A.2d at 461-63. There is a scarcity of case law regarding standards
to be set concerning conditional release for such individuals. See United States v. Ecker, 479
F.2d 1206, 1209 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judge Bazelon, writing for a unanimous court,
attributed this "to the rapidity with which patients' circumstances can be, and are changed,
and the consequent frustration of adequate judicial review." Id.
Some authorities attribute the lack of information, needed as a foundation for determining release standards, to the overprediction of aangerousness resulting in the
confinement of most patients and an inadequate statistical base. See Dershowitz, supra note
27, at 47; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note.25, at 85; Schreiber, supra note 27, at
619. For a general discussion of the problems inherent in release and some suggested
solutions see Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38
TEXAs L. REv. 849, 867-68 (1960).
82 64 N.J. at 403, 316 A.2d at 461.
83 Id. at 404, 316 A.2d at 461.
84 Id. at 403, 316 A.2d at 461.
85 Id. at 404, 316 A.2d at 461.
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even if the patient poses "no threat to society," confinement may
continue "if further progress can be made in 'curing' his underlying condition.

'8 6

The court suggests that mere "hopes of eventual

recovery" may mandate prolonged confinement in the interests of
public protection.8 7 To the extent that hopes of cure or of eventual
recovery result in confinement of those who are no longer dangerous to themselves or to others, Carter may deny conditional release
to one who would otherwise be eligible for unconditional release if
he had been confined under civil statutes. 88
In discussing how the trial court should approach its consideration of "dangerousness," the court offers many possible
definitions, ranging from commission of any unlawful act to acts
which threaten violence. s9 Other than suggesting that public policy
may be different in cases where the potential threat to society
involves physical violence, 90 the court offers no guidance as to
which definition should predominate. 9 ' Nevertheless, the court
appears to require a finding regarding the patient's potential threat
to society:
Release is to occur only 'if a combination of conditions may be
found that would reduce the likelihood of dangerous behavior
below the standard required for commitment .
86

*.'..92

Id. The implications raised by this statement are attacked as "big brotherism" by

Justice Clifford, who urges adoption of a standard based on dangerousness to self or others
so long as terms of conditional release are complied with. Id. at 423-24, 316 A.2d at 471-72.
"[D]anger to himself or others" is the standard adopted in the proposed revision to New
Jersey's penal code, utilizing the same standard proposed in section 4.08(3) of the Model
Penal Code. Compare S. 1115, supra note 30, §§ 5b-c with MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(3)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
87 64 N.J. at 404, 316 A.2d at 461.
88 Dangerousness to self and others is the standard for unconditional release of those
committed under civil statutes in New Jersey. See, e.g., State v. Caralluzzo, 49 N.J. 152, 156,
228 A.2d 693, 695 (1967); DiGiovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 572, 250 A.2d 756, 768
(App. Div. 1969), modified on other grounds, 55 N.J. 188, 260 A.2d 510 (1970); In re J.W., 44
N.J. Super. 216, 221-22, 130 A.2d 64, 66-67 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 465, 132 A.2d
558 (1957); In re Heukelekian, 24 N.J. Super. 407, 409, 94 A.2d 501, 502 (App. Div.
1953). For a discussion of the equal protection problems posed by the differences in the
release standards see notes 107-13 infra and accompanying text.
89 64 N.J. at 404-05, 316 A.2d at 461-62.
90 Id. at 405, 316 A.2d at 462. The court, however, also cites to Overholser v. O'Beirne,
302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961), which cautions that non-violent criminal acts may
nonetheless be dangerous both to society and the perpetrator. 64 N.J. at 405, 316 A.2d at
462.
9, 64 N.J. at 404-05, 316 A.2d at 461-62.
92 Id. at 406, 316 A.2d at 462 (quoting from United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502, 513
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)). It is unclear whether the court intends this
formula to be dispositive or merely to be a suggested approach. Justice Clifford found this
statement irreconcilable with the court's earlier statement that " '[d]angerousness is not ...
the sole criterion for release,' " and " 'dangerousness by itself is not a sufficiently specific
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This admonition by the court presents several practical problems. The first is the absence of even a general definition of what
constitutes dangerous behavior. A second is that the "dangerous
behavior . . . required for commitment" becomes a meaningless
standard when this "behavior" is merely a continuation of the
underlying illness. 93 While the breadth and vagueness of the
court's "dangerousness" standard permits the trial judge wide
latitude and flexibility in fashioning a conditional release, it also
invites a wide -variation in interpretation and application, potentially resulting in vastly different standards being applied through94
out the state.
A final problem inherent in the court's directive is the "combination of conditions" required to "reduce the likelihood of dangerous behavior. '9 5 It is apparent from this statement, when read with
the court's specific requirements of supervisory and out-patient
facilities, 9 6 that release may depend as much on the availability of
adequate living and out-patient facilities as it does on the patient's
ability to function outside confinement. The inference is that
where these facilities are available, release may be granted; where
they are not, release will be denied. 97 That a person may be denied
liberty or may be confined indefinitely on this basis raises the
question of whether a patient's rights to equal protection, due
process and treatment are being violated. 98
Carter recognized a patient's right to treatment as evidenced by
guide to the formulation of conditional release standards.' " 64 N.J. at 423-24, 316 A.2d at
471-72 (quoting from id. at 404-05, 316 A.2d at 461).
93 The current basis for commitment for a person acquitted or dismissed of charges on
grounds of insanity is whether the underlying illness continues. See note 5 supra.
14 By putting forth a wide range of possible considerations drawn from case law in
other jurisdictions, the court, in effect, has provided the trial judge with authority for any
decision he might make. For example, one judge might deny release to one showing
potential for committing any unlawful act, while another judge might deny release only
when there is a threat of serious bodily harm to another. Both could find ample justification
for their respective decisions in Carter.See 64 N.J. at 404-05, 409, 316 A.2d at 461-62, 464.
95 64 N.J. at 406, 316 A.2d at 462 (quoting from United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502,
513 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)).
96 64 N.J. at 403-04, 316 A.2d at 461.
91 The court emphasizes that "[p]erhaps most important is the establishment of
psychiatric out-patient care," and that "[t]he success of conditional release depends, to a
large extent, upon the adequacy of the supervisory controls imposed by the courts." Id. at
403, 316 A.2d at 461.
9 See note 29 supra. It is possible that lack of facilities could cause similar deprivations
for those committed under civil statutes. However, under the civil statutes, the hospital
administrator is under an affirmative duty to provide suitable arrangements should conditional release be deemed therapeutic. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-107 (Supp. 1974-75). In
addition, a civil patient must be released if he is no longer dangerous to himself or to others.
See note 86 supra.
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legislative intent 9 9 and case law, 1 °0 but concluded that the problem

of delineating its scope was not before the court. 10 ' By holding that
Carter could be eligible for a conditional release, the court has
increased the possibilities for therapeutic solutions and it would
appear, has effectively added substance to his right to treatment.
Despite this fact, a patient's right to treatment and the state's

obligation to provide it remain problems where confinement may
be anti-therapeutic but the patient remains ineligible for release.
For instance, where denial of release rests solely on the lack of
out-patient facilities, it may be asked whether the right to treatment extends to the right to state-provided out-patient living and
treatment centers. Where one is to be confined for his own good in
hope of a cure, it may be asked whether the state should carry an
affirmative burden not only to provide treatment but to demonstrate that confinement is, in fact, beneficial to the patient. Without

such a showing, confinement may be a denial of due process as
mandated by Jackson.10 2 Where confinement is due to danger
posed to others, the absence of treatment may raise the issue of
03
preventive detention or cruel and unusual punishment.1
Another approach to release bearing on the right to treatment
99 For a discussion of the court's view of legislative intent see note 69 supra.
10064 N.J. at 393-94, 316 A.2d at 455-56. The court states that "[t]he right to treatment
is an affirmative obligation on behalf of the State." Id. at 393, 316 A.2d at 455 (citing In re
D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 285 A.2d 283, 286 (App. Div. 1971). Exactly how far the right to
treatment extends remains undefined. In Singer v. State, 63 N.J. 319, 307 A.2d 94, cert.
granted, 63 N.J. 504, 308 A.2d 669 (1973), the supreme court reversed an appellate decision
based on In re D.D. which had held that a civilly committed mental patient could not be
confined in the Forensic Division (Vroom Building) with the "criminally insane." 63 N.J. at
322-23, 307 A.2d at 96. The supreme court stated that "[a]bsent evidence that the housing
together of both categories of patients injures the non-convict patient in some way," the
appellate judgment must be reversed. Id. at 323, 307 A.2d at 96.
101 64 N.J. at 393, 316 A.2d at 455. However, the Carter court seems to acknowledge
that the right to treatment exists and that a petition for conditional release may be brought
on this basis:
While the Court is not now directly faced with delineating the scope of the right to
treatment in New Jersey, the existence of such a right bears on the availability of
conditional release, at least to the extent that such release is a therapeutic measure.
Id.
102 406 U.S. at 738. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
103 In United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973), for example, the
court was faced with an individual declared incompetent to stand trial who had been given
comprehensive sanity hearings over a three-year period and had been confined in seven
different institutions. Id. at 1381. Since it was not foreseeable that he would become
competent to stand trial and since there was no existing federal facility in which he could
receive effective care, the judge required that the accused be released from federal custody
and confinement on the basis that continued detention without adequate treatment had
"reached constitutional dimensions" involving the right to a speedy trial, due process, and
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1381-82.
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is that of "the least restrictive alternative," suggested by Justice
Clifford in his separate opinion. 104 According to this view, the
patient would have the right to treatment in the "least restrictive"
setting possible. Although this again would depend in part on
available facilities, a mandate that the trial court channel its efforts
in this direction may expand the possibilities for therapeutic
10 6
treatment' 0

5

and would appear consistent with legislative intent.

The majority in Carter declined to deal with the question of
whether those committed pursuant to criminal statutes merit equal
treatment with those committed under civil statutes.10 7 Justice Clifford, however, attacked this omission on the grounds that equal
protection requires that the mentally ill be treated alike in essential
matters and that since conditional release is available to those
civilly committed, it must be made available to those "criminally"
committed.1 0 8 Taking this point even further, he contended that
those whose charges have been dismissed or who have been acquitted are in fact civil committees and must therefore be treated
equally with other civil committees.10 9
What Justice Clifford did not discuss, however, is whether
there may be any rational basis for distinguishing those mentally ill
who have committed offenses as a result of their illness from those
who have not. Rather, he chose to read Jackson and Baxstrom as
mandating similar treatment for one like Carter," 0 despite the
differences among the respective defendants' situations. For instance, unlike the defendants in Jackson and Baxstrom, Carter's
104 64 N.J. at 421-23, 316 A.2d at 470-71. For a discussion of the origin of the least
restrictive alternative doctrine and its impact on commitment standards see Developments in
the Law, supra note 25, at 1245-53.
105 For various examples of how this doctrine may be applied to mentally ill patients
and result in non-institutional solutions see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supa note 25, at
91-92.
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (Supp. 1974-75) provides that the mentally ill be
accorded treatment "in accordance with the highest accepted standards," which easily would
seem to incorporate the least restrictive alternative doctrine in fight of data indicating
extended confinement is generally anti-therapeutic. See note 26 supra. Pending legislation
actually states a patient has a right "[t]o the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve
the purposes of treatment." N.J. Senate Bill No. 1117, § 10e(2) (approved by Senate on June
13, 1974).
10764 N.J. at 410, 316 A.2d at 464. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
'08 64 N.J. at 413-17, 316 A.2d at 466-68.
109Id. at 418, 316 A.2d at 469. Justice Clifford accepted the court's jurisdiction over the
release of those confined under criminal statutes, even though he retained "reservations
about the constitutionality of this differential in treatment." Id. at 419, 316 A.2d at 469.
1o Id. at 415-17, 316 A.2d at 467-68. Justice Clifford argued that "[tihe Jackson and
Carter cases are essentially the same" and that, "if anything, Carter presents even a stronger
equal protection argument since the charges against him had been dropped." Id. at 415, 316
A.2d at 467.
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insanity erupted into physical violence against another person."'
In contrast with Jackson and Baxstrom, Carter was adjudged incompetent to stand trial and insane at the time the offense was
committed, and was then given a separate pre-commitment hearing at which his insanity was found to continue."1 2 Arguably, establishing that Carter was capable of violence flowing from insanity
and finding that his insanity continued would satisfy Jackson and
Baxstrom and would justify the state's imposition of a stricter release
1 3
standard.'
While Justice Clifford's opinion that all mentally ill patients
should be treated alike, regardless of offenses they may have committed, may be questionable, t 14 his position that different stanIII Carter had, in fact, shot a policeman. Id. at 386, 316 A.2d at 451. Jackson had only
been accused of purse-snatching. 406 U.S. at 717. Baxstrom's insanity appeared after he was
imprisoned and was not a consideration in his original confinement. 383 U.S. at 108.
112 64 N.J. at 386, 316 A.2d at 451.
"' Even cases on which Justice Clifford relied appear to acknowledge the justification
for some differential treatment. In Baxstrom, the Court stated:
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane of
course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of
custodial or medical care to be given.
383 U.S. at 11l. The court in Bc.lton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 649 (5th Cir. 1968), read
Baxstrom to mean that while prior criminal behavior cannot be considered a sufficient basis
for substantial differences in commitment procedures and requirements, a reasonable application of the clual protection doctrine permits persons acquitted by reason of insanity to be
treated differently from civilly committed persons "to the extent that there are relevant
differences between these two groups." Id. at 649-51. The court even accepted "that commitment without a hearing is permissible for the period required to determine present
mental condition," even though this represented a different procedure from that followed in
regard to civilly committed patients. Id. Bolton indicated that while requirements for ultimate
confinement and burden of proof must be the same, the fact that one has been acquitted by
reason of insanity may help to show the requirements for commitment have been met. Id.
The Bolton court also continued to uphold release provisions, even though they differed
from civil commitment procedures, by providing court review of the hospital's decision to
release a patient. Id. at 652.
The court in United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1973), resisted
any argument that any differential treatment of the release of the two groups violates equal
protection. This court acknowledged, however,
[tihat the issue of what standard of review should be applied to release decisions is a
question of constitutional dimensions .... [involving] the validity of the substantive
and procedural terms of commitment against the requirements of the Constitution.
Id. at 1210 (footnote omitted).
Some authorities feel different procedures are justified for those mentally ill who have
committed offenses against the state and those who have not. See Hamann, The Confinement
and Release of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 4 HARV. J. LEc.is. 55, 57 (1966) (proven
dangerousness is adequate basis for treating individuals acquitted on grounds of insanity as a
special class).
" See notes 110-13 supra and accompanying text. However, an equal protection argument could be made upon an empirical basis. See Weihofen, supra note 81, at 855, in which
the assumption that the "criminally insane" are more dangerous than other mental hospital
inmates is asserted to be false. Contending that mentally ill patients who have committed
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dards are unconstitutional when they are irrelevant to dangerousness or to need for treatment is well taken. A standard which
results in indefinite confinement of one who is neither dangerous
to himself or others nor who would benefit from confinement
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because confinement does not then bear a " 'reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed'" as required by
Jackson.115 Standards irrelevant to dangerousness would also seem
to violate the equal protection clause by removing the very basis
-protection of the public-upon which the state draws its authority to impose a more stringent release standard.
In addition to leaving unresolved the question of how the
constitutional rights of equal protection and due process and the
right to treatment might affect a "criminally" committed mental
patient's quest for release, the Carter decision also leaves practical
questions unanswered. The first and most crucial involves the absence of any designated person or agency to handle the conditional
release. Problems relating to initiating the action for a release
hearing, setting up an acceptable home environment outside institutionalization, and arranging for out-patient care and reports to
the proper authorities are left unanswered. The Carter court requires only that reports should be sent by the patient and the
treating psychiatrist to a probation officer who in turn shall report
to the releasing court.' 1 6 Although it would appear that the administrators of the state hospital in which the person is confined
might be best equipped to handle such procedure-particularly
since they are authorized to handle conditional releases for civilly
committed patients- 17 they have taken the position that they
want no part of the administration of conditional releases for
criminally committed patients.'18 Similarly, another seemingly apviolent acts are essentially no different than those who have not, Weihofen states that
[t]hey run the same gamut of psychiatric disorders as psychiatric patients in general. Moreover, psychotic murderers respond to the same methods of care and
treatment as do other mental hospital patients.
Id. See Letter from Martin H. Weinberg, M.D., Department of Institutions and Agencies of
N.J., to author, October 8, 1974, on file at Seton Hall Law Review [hereinafter cited as Letter
from Weinberg].
115 64 N.J. at 420, 316 A.2d at 470 (quoting from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972)).
116 Id. at 408, 316 A.2d at 463.
117 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-107 (Supp. 1974-75) authorizes the hospital administrator to
make necessary arrangements when care outside confinement is deemed beneficial to the
patient. Justice Clifford questions the extent to which the conditional release provision is
exercised. 64 N.J. at 416 n.2, 316 A.2d at 467-68.
1'
According to the Director of the Division of Mental Health and Hospitals, Department of Institutions and Agencies:
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propriate agency, the fledgling Mental Health Division of the Department of the Public Advocate,' 1 9 has indicated it will not handle
conditional release hearings.12 0 The result is a void to be filled at
21
the discretion of involved judges, prosecutors and attorneys.1
Concomitantly, a petitioner's case for release becomes even more
-difficult to establish because it appears virtually impossible to demonstrate "clearly and convincingly" that "adequate supervisory controls" exist when there is no supervising authority to initiate them.
If conditional release is to become a reality, responsibilities will
have to be allocated to appropriate authorities.
A second problem concerns the duration of the court's jurisdiction over a conditionally released mental patient. One solution
would be to retain jurisdiction until the patient demonstrates to the
trial court that he is no longer in need of such supervisory controls.
A prima facie demonstration might proffer a period of time during which there has been no evidence of relapse or serious incident. Eventually, it would seem feasible to establish a certain
period after which jurisdiction would cease automatically, absent a
showing by the state of a need for continuing supervision.' 2 2
A third problem arising from Carter involves the court's ability
to recall summarily a patient "upon being notified that some problem has arisen which jeopardizes the safety and well being of the
patient or those around him. 1

23

Which acts, signs, or manifesta-

Hospital administrators do not want any part in post-release supervision on
grounds that the goals of the hospital are therapeutic and these would be adversely
affected by the probation type of supervision Carter demands. In fact, the administrators question the value of the Carter-type release since it differentiates among
the patients in a manner in which the hospitals themselves do not by placing certain
patients under a different release standard.
Letter from Weinberg, supra note 114.
119 N.J. Assembly Bill No. 1409, art. IlII (approved by Assembly on May 13, 1974)
establishes a Division of Mental Health Advocacy within the Department of the Public
Advocate. For a brief discussion of this Division see note 30 supra.
120 Since the Division on Mental Health will have offices in only two counties and
Carter-type release hearings will be held in counties throughout the state, the Division, which
is not currently staffed to serve every county, will not handle conditional releases. Perlin
Interview, supra note 30.
121 For instance, at a recent conditional release hearing, release was dependent upon
the patient's acceptance into a halfway house program. Krol v. State, No. 534-69, at 2-3
(N.J., Camden County Ct., Aug. 2, 1974) (consent order). The application to this program
was suggested and arranged by the Assistant Prosecutor, who represented the county at the
hearing. Letter from John McFeely, Assistant Prosecutor, Camden County, to author, Sept.
18, 1974, on file at Seton Hall Law Review.
122 Senate Bill No. 1115 calls for a five year period. S. 1115, supra note 30, § 5d. If the
probation department is to act as the supervisory agency, the question arises as to whether
the patient will come under the purview of probation statutes. If so, jurisdiction must
terminate after five years. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:168-1 (1971).
123 64 N.J. at 408, 316 A.2d at 463.
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tions will trigger a summary recall?1 24 Without some sort of procedural safeguard, it is conceivable a person could be recommitted
unjustifiably. The Supreme Court has held that liberty, even in
conjunction with parole and probation, cannot be taken away without due process. 125 Conditional release from a mental institution
would appear equally deserving of fourteenth amendment protections.
Although the total effect of these unresolved issues may be to
retard the implementation of conditional release, some of these
problems may be judicially resolvable. For instance, adoption of a
release standard based on dangerousness would appear to satisfy
equal protection and due process requirements, while still providing the flexibility and control necessary to ensure society's safety. A
court's assessment of a patient's present or potential dangerousness, for example, could be reflected in the type of conditions
imposed upon his release. Regardless, the mentally ill should be
treated and classified according to their status as dangerous or
non-dangerous rather than their status as criminal or civil committees. It would also seem advisable for the court to arrive at a
general understanding of the dangerousness which would preclude
release. Considering the drastic deprivation of liberty involved, the
preferable definition would stress the likelihood of serious bodily
or psychic injury to self and others.
Requiring a petitioner to establish his eligibility for release by a
preponderance of the evidence seems more appropriate under the
circumstances than the clear and convincing demonstration currently required. As noted by the Carter majority, the field of predicting human behavior is by its nature uncertain. 126 When combined with the difficulty of assessing psychiatric testimony and the
usual conflicts of opinion among psychiatrists themselves, 127 it ap124

The, probation officers who will ultimately be charged with the duty of supervising

conditionally released patients are concerned with the scope of their authority regarding
summary recall. They are particularly troubled by the lack of guidelines delineating the
conduct which will justify action by the probationary officer. Letter from John Janowski,
Bergen County Probation Department, to author, August 21, 1974, on file at Seton HaU Law
Review.
125 See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (revocation of probation,
like parole, involves loss of liberty and accordingly entitles a probationer to due process
protections); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (loss of liberty threatened by,
revocation of parole is "within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment").
121 64 N.J. at 396, 409, 316 A.2d at 457, 464.
127 The psychiatric testimony in Carter's case exemplifies the problem. One psychiatrist,
testifying for the state, called Carter a catatonic schizophrenic who was "'potentially dangerous to others.' " Id. at 396, 316 A.2d at 457. A second psychiatrist determined that any
manifestation of schizophrenia was residual and concluded that Carter would not experience
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pears almost impossible to meet the clear and convincing standard.
Despite the problems left in the wake of Carter, the decision
has laid groundwork which will inevitably involve the courts, hospital administrators and other agencies in further developing
therapeutic alternatives to lifetime confinement. Carter also has the
effect of negating the harsh effect of Maik by providing a release
mechanism for those whose condition will never be "cured" or
"effectively neutralized." Although it remains to be seen whether
Carter standards will be considered in post-acquittal deliberations, it
would seem a logical step to introduce its provisions when the
determination as to the patient's continuing insanity is made. If the
patient, following either acquittal or dismissal of charges on
grounds of insanity, is found to be in remission and the other
requirements of Carter are met, there seems no reason why conditional release should not be granted.
Joan Foster
another serious episode if properly supervised. Id. A third psychiatrist testified Carter "was
no longer dangerous and that he could safely be reintegrated into society." Id. (footnote
omitted).

